Peace Initiatives: CoHA and the Helsinki MoU
Before the government introduced martial law in May 2003, there was a peace initiative sponsored by foreign countries. However, the efforts were not effective. In this section, we will investigate the failure of initial peace-making policies.
CoHA
On 9 December 2002, both Indonesian government and GAM agreed to sign Cessation of the Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). This agreement was facilitated by Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a prominent international peace NGO in Switzerland. According to Elsam, having dialog between the government and GAM was significant to reduce the conflict incentive.[1] However, in reality, both TNI and GAM were not willing to reduce their forces.[2] The lack of faith between the two parties made it difficult for HDC to facilitate peace in Aceh.[3]
The failure of CoHA seemed to have several reasons. First, both parties could not agree the rearrangement of legitimate military operations in Aceh. Second, they could not agree on the future political status of Aceh, especially regarding the extent of regional autonomy. Third, Aceh’s right of managing its own economic resources was not determined.[4]
CoHA was fully supported by European Union (EU), and its monitoring missions supported by Thailand and the Philippine. Japan also tried to help the promotion of CoHA by hosting the negotiation meeting between the government of Indonesia and GAM in Tokyo in May 2003.[5] However, all these efforts could not prevent the collapse of CoHA. Soon after the Tokyo meeting, the Megawati government declared martial law, which effectively breached CoHA and brought Aceh back to the era of internal war.
The Helsinki MoU
The military campaign in Aceh during the martial law and civil emergency continued until December 2004. However, there was a sign of change in the Indonesian side since October 2004 when Megawati was defeated by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the country’s first direct presidential election held in September of the year. Soon after the birth of the new government, Yudhoyono and vice president Jusuf Kalla secretly negotiated with GAM leaders to find the “exit” of the civil emergency. Amidst the negotiation, Aceh was hit by tsunami on 26 December 2004. The tsunami affected more than 200,000 people; many of them either died or is still missing. Ironically, this disaster became a significant momentum to restart an official peace negotiation between the government and GAM.
In fact, both TNI and GAM believed that the war could not be continued after the tsunami which totally destroyed Aceh. The government asked Marti Ahtisaari[6] to coordinate the peace negotiation, and in August 2005, both the government and GAM finally agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki. The MoU asked Jakarta to abandon military operations in Aceh and reduce the significant number of troops. The MoU also asked GAM to disarm itself and abandon independence from Indonesia. This peace agreement was welcomed by international community. To monitor the promise of both sides, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was set up and came into being in September 2005.[7] AMM was led by the European Union and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). It is now regarded by peace and conflict resolution experts as a model for the management and resolution of conflict elsewhere in the world.[8]
The Post-Helsinki Aceh
The international community responded quickly with governments and nongovernmental organizations pledging close to US$6 billion for reconstruction in Aceh. The Indonesian government’s own contribution brought the total up to about US$9 billion.[9] President Yudhoyono was quick to reassure the international community that his government was serious about fighting corruption.[10] However, corruption in Indonesia was widespread, and it soon became a concern for both international community and civil society groups in Aceh.
In fact, the government established the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh (BRR) to develop policies and programs for the post-conflict Aceh. BRR was also in charge of allocating reconstruction funds from overseas. However, as we will discuss later, BRR soon became a storehouse of corruption. Indonesia’s bureaucrats, Aceh’s local politicians and former GAM members became busy for seeking money and business opportunities in the process of Aceh’s reconstruction. The political patronage was reorganized in the post-Helsinki Aceh. Inevitably, the power of politico-economic elites overwhelmed that of civil society in Aceh. Peace has arrived in Aceh, but civil society movements to “democratize” Aceh’s political process still continue.
Reintegration has been the focus of the peace process in Aceh. The task of implementing the long-term reintegration program envisaged by the Helsinki MoU was given to the Aceh Reintegration Authority (BRA) As a result the new BRA focuses solely on social and economic programs and has been funded almost entirely by the national budget. Despite many challenges the BRA reintegration programs have managed to deliver economic assistance to former GAM combatants, former anti-separatist militia groups, conflict affected communities, and many families of civilians killed during the conflict.[11]
[1] Ibid., p.3.
[2] Stephen Sherdock, “Conflict in Aceh: A Military Solution,” Current Issue Brief No. 32 2002-03.
[3] “Aceh: Balloting for Peace and Democracy,” Pilkada Nangroe Aceh Darussalam ( NAD), Report of International Observation Missions. 2006, p.16.
[4] Komnas HAM. KOMNAS HAM Aceh Laporan Tim AD HOC Aceh、Komisi National Hak Asasi Manusia, 2004, p.180.
[5] Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenge In Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution. East-West Center. Washington, 2004, p.46.
[6] Ahtisaari was the Prime Minister of Finland. He was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 due to his role in the Helsinki Peace Agreement on Aceh.
[7] Christine Susanna Thjin “Post Tsunami Reconstruction and Peace Building in Aceh: Political Impacts and Potential Risks,” Working Paper Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, October 2005, p.5.
[8] Tapol. The Indonesia Human Right Campaign:. Resounding victory for democracy in Aceh, 14 January, 2007.
[9] “Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias.” World Bank, 2005, p. 63. http://www.worldbank.org
[10] Elizabeth James. “Asia Pacific School of Economics and Goverment.” Discussion Paper, Policy and Governace. Clean on Currupt: Tsunami Aid in Aceh , 2006, p.8.
[11] Elizabeth James., ibid, p.3.
CoHA
On 9 December 2002, both Indonesian government and GAM agreed to sign Cessation of the Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). This agreement was facilitated by Henry Dunant Centre (HDC), a prominent international peace NGO in Switzerland. According to Elsam, having dialog between the government and GAM was significant to reduce the conflict incentive.[1] However, in reality, both TNI and GAM were not willing to reduce their forces.[2] The lack of faith between the two parties made it difficult for HDC to facilitate peace in Aceh.[3]
The failure of CoHA seemed to have several reasons. First, both parties could not agree the rearrangement of legitimate military operations in Aceh. Second, they could not agree on the future political status of Aceh, especially regarding the extent of regional autonomy. Third, Aceh’s right of managing its own economic resources was not determined.[4]
CoHA was fully supported by European Union (EU), and its monitoring missions supported by Thailand and the Philippine. Japan also tried to help the promotion of CoHA by hosting the negotiation meeting between the government of Indonesia and GAM in Tokyo in May 2003.[5] However, all these efforts could not prevent the collapse of CoHA. Soon after the Tokyo meeting, the Megawati government declared martial law, which effectively breached CoHA and brought Aceh back to the era of internal war.
The Helsinki MoU
The military campaign in Aceh during the martial law and civil emergency continued until December 2004. However, there was a sign of change in the Indonesian side since October 2004 when Megawati was defeated by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the country’s first direct presidential election held in September of the year. Soon after the birth of the new government, Yudhoyono and vice president Jusuf Kalla secretly negotiated with GAM leaders to find the “exit” of the civil emergency. Amidst the negotiation, Aceh was hit by tsunami on 26 December 2004. The tsunami affected more than 200,000 people; many of them either died or is still missing. Ironically, this disaster became a significant momentum to restart an official peace negotiation between the government and GAM.
In fact, both TNI and GAM believed that the war could not be continued after the tsunami which totally destroyed Aceh. The government asked Marti Ahtisaari[6] to coordinate the peace negotiation, and in August 2005, both the government and GAM finally agreed to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki. The MoU asked Jakarta to abandon military operations in Aceh and reduce the significant number of troops. The MoU also asked GAM to disarm itself and abandon independence from Indonesia. This peace agreement was welcomed by international community. To monitor the promise of both sides, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was set up and came into being in September 2005.[7] AMM was led by the European Union and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). It is now regarded by peace and conflict resolution experts as a model for the management and resolution of conflict elsewhere in the world.[8]
The Post-Helsinki Aceh
The international community responded quickly with governments and nongovernmental organizations pledging close to US$6 billion for reconstruction in Aceh. The Indonesian government’s own contribution brought the total up to about US$9 billion.[9] President Yudhoyono was quick to reassure the international community that his government was serious about fighting corruption.[10] However, corruption in Indonesia was widespread, and it soon became a concern for both international community and civil society groups in Aceh.
In fact, the government established the Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh (BRR) to develop policies and programs for the post-conflict Aceh. BRR was also in charge of allocating reconstruction funds from overseas. However, as we will discuss later, BRR soon became a storehouse of corruption. Indonesia’s bureaucrats, Aceh’s local politicians and former GAM members became busy for seeking money and business opportunities in the process of Aceh’s reconstruction. The political patronage was reorganized in the post-Helsinki Aceh. Inevitably, the power of politico-economic elites overwhelmed that of civil society in Aceh. Peace has arrived in Aceh, but civil society movements to “democratize” Aceh’s political process still continue.
Reintegration has been the focus of the peace process in Aceh. The task of implementing the long-term reintegration program envisaged by the Helsinki MoU was given to the Aceh Reintegration Authority (BRA) As a result the new BRA focuses solely on social and economic programs and has been funded almost entirely by the national budget. Despite many challenges the BRA reintegration programs have managed to deliver economic assistance to former GAM combatants, former anti-separatist militia groups, conflict affected communities, and many families of civilians killed during the conflict.[11]
[1] Ibid., p.3.
[2] Stephen Sherdock, “Conflict in Aceh: A Military Solution,” Current Issue Brief No. 32 2002-03.
[3] “Aceh: Balloting for Peace and Democracy,” Pilkada Nangroe Aceh Darussalam ( NAD), Report of International Observation Missions. 2006, p.16.
[4] Komnas HAM. KOMNAS HAM Aceh Laporan Tim AD HOC Aceh、Komisi National Hak Asasi Manusia, 2004, p.180.
[5] Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenge In Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution. East-West Center. Washington, 2004, p.46.
[6] Ahtisaari was the Prime Minister of Finland. He was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 due to his role in the Helsinki Peace Agreement on Aceh.
[7] Christine Susanna Thjin “Post Tsunami Reconstruction and Peace Building in Aceh: Political Impacts and Potential Risks,” Working Paper Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, October 2005, p.5.
[8] Tapol. The Indonesia Human Right Campaign:. Resounding victory for democracy in Aceh, 14 January, 2007.
[9] “Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias.” World Bank, 2005, p. 63. http://www.worldbank.org
[10] Elizabeth James. “Asia Pacific School of Economics and Goverment.” Discussion Paper, Policy and Governace. Clean on Currupt: Tsunami Aid in Aceh , 2006, p.8.
[11] Elizabeth James., ibid, p.3.
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